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Integration and autonomy dynamics in the post-acquisition process 
Prior research on acquisition implementation has emphasized the challenge of balancing 
integration and autonomy (Graebner 2004). However, recent work has also emphasized the 
need to better distinguish integration and autonomy as two distinct dimensions of post-
acquisition implementation (Zaheer, Castañer et al. 2013). Moreover, there have been repeated 
calls to better understand what is really going on during the post-acquisition implementation 
process, contingent on the type of post-acquisition mode (Graebner, Heimeriks et al. 2017).  
The typology of post-acquisition modes presented by Haspelagh and Jemison (1991) focuses 
on the managerial actions and the transfer of capabilities between the acquiring parent and the 
acquired target through mechanisms of resource sharing, functional skills transfer, and general 
management capability. Alongside this strategic task of transferring capabilities to create value, 
the degree of organizational autonomy granted to the target reflects a concern for protecting the 
target’s strategic capabilities which have motivated the acquisition in the first place. 
Acquisitions in which the strategic purpose is the exploitation of tacit and socially complex 
knowledge embedded in the target’s organization are symbiotic acquisitions that require both a 
high degree of integration and a high degree of autonomy in order to succeed. A key 
recommendation for managing symbiotic acquisitions is thus to delay the integration process, 
providing an opportunity for mutual learning and the establishment of trust between the two 
organizations before integration occurs (Graebner 2004). Yet, the implicit result from this 
sequential approach advocated by the existing literature is that, even in cases of symbiotic 
acquisition, full integration will eventually occur and lead to the amalgamation of the target 
into the parent company. 
Moreover, although prior research on the subsequent performance of acquired firms is 
increasing, most prior post-acquisition studies have focused on the effects on the acquiring 
firms (Barden 2012). For example, prior work on the influences of acquisitions on innovation 
suggests that acquisitions can have both positive and negative influences on the performance 
of the acquiring firm (Capron 1999, Ahuja 2001, Haleblian 2009). On the other hand, some 
work has looked into the recombination of resources for technological innovation by the 
acquired firm (Capron and Pistre 2002, Sears and Hoetker 2014) and the degree of autonomy 
in R&D by the acquired firm (Schweizer 2005). 
Yet, underlying most of this work on the transfer of capabilities between acquired and 
acquiring firms, especially work focusing on symbiotic acquisitions, is the assumption that the 
acquired target is actually performing well. Indeed, prior works shows that acquirers are 
generally unable to successfully restructure severely distressed firms and that the acquisition of 
deeply troubled targets decreased acquirers’ long term accounting and market returns 
(Haleblian 2009). In turn, the acquisition of a distressed firm usually follows a logic of 
absorbing the key assets or capabilities into the acquiring firm and speedily divesting the rest, 
thereby highlighting speed of integration as a key driver of M&A transaction success (Angwin 
2004, Homburg and Bucerius 2006, Bauer and Matzler 2014). 
A process perspective on acquisitions has been advocated for a long time, starting with 
studies of the antecedents and the deal making itself (Jemison and Sitkin 1986). Birkinshaw 
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(2000) distinguishes between the task integration, based on transfers of capabilities and 
resource sharing, and the human integration which ultimately generate a shared identity among 
the employees from both companies. Yet, some authors have argued that despite the wealth of 
post-acquisition literature there is little systematic coverage of the temporal dynamics and the 
changes that take place in the post-acquisition period (e.g. Angwin and Meadows 2015, 
Steigenberger 2017). Detailed process research, anchored in a resource-based view of 
integration (Cording, Christmann et al. 2008), may help to better conceptualize the temporal 
dynamics of target integration and target autonomy during successive stages of post-acquisition 
(Graebner, Heimeriks et al. 2017). 
If a symbiotic acquisition is a transitory state before integration leading to absorption, then 
how do the integration and autonomy dynamics interact over time? How can a poor 
performance target ever regain autonomy and escape amalgamation? 
Method and case overview 
Given the strong call in the literature for detailed process theorizing, we follow a qualitative 
approach. Moreover, most of the literature focuses on timeframes of two to five years after the 
acquisition event. However, to really observe the dynamics of interest, detailed longitudinal 
data must be collected over a longer timescale. Hence, we chose a single case design (Yin 2014) 
and selected an extreme case (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), Automobili Lamborghini, which 
does not easily fit most PMI typologies: the acquisition by a large group of a small, distressed 
company, which is then turned around very successfully through strategic integration; yet, 
eventually manages to regain significant autonomy and escape amalgamation. 
 Muira, Countach, Diablo: these are iconic names of « super sports cars ». However, the 
Automobili Lamborghini company behind these bulls’ names was far from a cash-cow 
business. During a 35-year period spanning from its founding in 1963 to 1998, the company 
went bankrupt once, was briefly turned around twice, and ended up being sold five times. Yet, 
since last being acquired by Audi in 1999 the company has grown a twenty-fold.  
Working with Lamborghini since 2010, we have been collecting empirical data to better 
understand the post-acquisition process underlying its extreme and sustainable turnaround. We 
designed a qualitative, multilevel, dyadic, and longitudinal research to theorize this strategic 
renewal process. Specifically, we focused a large part of our data collection on the development 
of the Aventador, their “halo” model which clearly marks a bifurcation in the post-acquisition 
integration with Audi. Figure 1 shows the evolution of sales, employees, R&D employees, 
number of patents, and the development and launch of car models over an 18-year period from 
the year of the acquisition in 1999 to 2017. 
Insert Figure 1 
We first contacted Automobili Lamborghini in November 2010. At that time, the Gallardo 
model was at mid-lifecycle and had been a great success. The company had just finished the 
development of their next super-sports car, the Aventador. During our first visit, the production 
line was still being setup, with the start of production and the commercialization of the new 
model scheduled for early 2011. Our first idea when contacting Lamborghini was to conduct a 
research project on their innovative capabilities following the acquisition. We wanted to explore 
the recent development phase (2007 – 2010) of the Aventador which Lamborghini wanted to 
be “the ultimate super sports car of the future”. Their vision was to push the technological 
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boundaries on several components and to redefine the rules of this niche segment. Our initial 
design was thus based on embedded case studies of their development of radical innovations 
for several sub-systems and components of the car. As shown in figure 2, we focused on the 
development of the carbon fiber monocoque, independent shift-rod gearbox, push-rod 
suspension, lifting system, super capacitor for stop-and-start of the V12 engine, carbon ceramic 
disk brakes, and ceramic coating for thermal protection of the aesthetical tailpipe. However, as 
the qualitative inquiry progressed (and the market success of Aventador became apparent in 
real time), the issues of integration and autonomy very quickly became prevalent in the 
empirical data. It became apparent that the development of the Aventador represented a clear 
bifurcation in post-acquisition trajectory. Hence, we adjusted our research design to better 
understand the integration and autonomy dynamics in the post-acquisition process. 
Insert Figure 2 
Data 
Our qualitative process theorizing is based on primary data collected through 68 semi-
structured interviews with 42 informants. All these interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim and we took extensive notes. We conducted 42 interviews with 25 informants from 
Lamborghini across functions (purchasing, manufacturing, quality, finance, marketing, sales, 
R&D, HR, design) and across multiple levels (engineers, project managers, heads of functional 
areas, and board directors; including the two CEOs for 1999-2004 and 2005-2016). Several 
informants had tenure at Lamborghini since the mid-1990s and most of them had joined around 
2001, just after the acquisition. We conducted 4 interviews with 4 executive directors of Audi 
who had successively followed the acquisition over the 18-year period and had been seating on 
the board of Lamborghini. We also conducted 22 interviews with 17 informants from the 
partner companies across Europe (one US based) with whom Lamborghini had developed the 
selected radical innovations, as indicated in figure 2. Our analysis is also based on extensive 
secondary data covering two decades of annual reports, press releases, industry reports, 
newspaper and magazine articles, patent data, as well as social media communications and 
videos posted by the company since 2012. 
In constructing our multi-level, longitudinal, dyadic dataset, we took care to control for 
retrospective bias through non-leading questions, triangulation, multiple interviews with some 
informants, and other rigor devices. We visited the company in Sant’Agata, Italy over 20 times 
and took extensive notes of our non-participant observations (meeting with suppliers, visits of 
factory, of R&D offices, of canteen, etc). We wrote a 400-pages case narrative which we 
distributed to our main informant at Lamborghini. Some of the authors did not participate in 
the data collection. This allows to maintain critical appraisal of the emerging findings. 
Analysis 
Our analysis followed the Gioia process theorizing approach (Gioia, Corley et al. 2013). We 
start with a temporal bracketing analysis (Langley 1999) which identified three stages in the 
post-acquisition process: “hygiene and survival” (informants’ terms), bifurcation, and new 
beginning. We coded for first order themes throughout the interviews. We then followed an 
abductive approach of looking in diverse literatures and going back to the data to better 
understand what was already covered in the literature and which novel interactions we could 
infer from our data. This instructed our axial coding to capture second-order concept. The usual 
concepts of resources sharing and managerial capabilities were obvious. Yet, the concepts of 
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construed external image, future desired images, and projected image found in the 
organizational identity literature also became very salient in the data. We then used our 
empirical data to check the existence and polarity of causal interactions among all the second 
order concepts. By combining the temporal bracketing and causal relationships, empirically 
grounded in our data, we were then able to construct a process model that captures the recursive 
dynamics between integration efforts, resource orchestration, and identity resurgence. 
Findings  
During a first phase of “hygiene and survival”, Lamborghini got access to the resources and 
capabilities of the Audi VW group. The integration efforts by the top management team (TMT) 
of the parent company were quite clear and rigidly imposed (new product development process, 
purchasing processes, selection of suppliers, quality control, manufacturing, etc.). Lamborghini 
was able to access the aluminum expertise of Audi and some electronics components from the 
group suppliers which it could never get before. The Gallardo was the first car developed as a 
platform with the group – which then became the Audi R8 – and led to a broadening of the 
addressable market. Its huge success induced a very strong response by competitors such as 
Ferrari and MacLaren. After this initial survival phase, the new CEO of Lamborghini started 
using several devices to test the brand in its market. Then by 2007, it was time to renew its 
ageing V12 product. When Audi indicated that this new car should continue on the success 
recipe of the Gallardo – a group platform with aluminum frame – the top management team of 
Lamborghini leveraged the renewed strength in its organizational identity to step out of the 
platform and to “demonstrate what Lamborghini could do again”. The centripetal forces of the 
integration processes were becoming very strong. Even if the initial intention was to protect the 
development capability of Lamborghini (especially in engine management), Lamborghini felt 
that their distinctiveness was eroding and that they had to renew their core competencies. The 
identity resurgence informed their strategic vision of what Lamborghini could become. The 
TMT presented this vision to the Audi board, and the CEO of the VW group, who finally 
granted autonomy to Lamborghini. However, Lamborghini did not have all the resources and 
capabilities required to deliver the technological vision of the Aventador. Thus, they selected 
specific suppliers with whom they developed the radical innovation and absorbed a lot of new 
competencies. In particular, Lamborghini was able to completely renew its competencies in 
carbon fiber and composite materials, which is now one of its sources of competitive advantage.  
The case findings demonstrate a clear link between the identity resurgence and the future 
desired image. This future desired image in turn informs their strategic vision which is an input 
to the resource orchestration process. Moreover, while access to the parent resources and 
capabilities through integration efforts improved the performance of the company, it also 
reduced the distinctiveness of the construed external image that the TMT of Lamborghini 
perceived. This led to increased efforts to regain autonomy by leveraging past success, 
improved image, trust from the parent company, and their own internal resources and 
capabilities. By granting more autonomy to Lamborghini, Audi allowed them to work with 
suppliers outside those selected by the VW group and to develop radical innovations. This 
process improved the distinctiveness of Lamborghini resources and capabilities. However, over 
time, as these radical innovations were transferred to the parent company’s products, their 
distinctiveness also decreased, prompting Lamborghini to request more autonomy on other 




Our process model demonstrate the recursive dynamics between integration efforts, resource 
orchestration, organizational identity, and the regaining of autonomy during the post-
acquisition process of a distressed company. While the post-acquisition literature emphasizes a 
sequential approach to symbiotic acquisition to protect the target’s specific capabilities, the 
centripetal forces of the integration efforts seem to lead inescapably to the amalgamation of the 
acquired firm into the acquiring firm. It is worth noting that these dynamics can really become 
apparent only when a long timeframe (18 years in our case) is adopted.  
Our process theorizing explains how an acquired company can regain autonomy by 
leveraging the interactions between its resource orchestration and the resurgence of its 
organizational identity. By regaining autonomy, the acquired firms can access resources and 
capabilities from external partners and renew its core competencies through absorptive 
capacity, hence renewing its distinctiveness. By granting more autonomy to the acquired firm, 
the acquiring firm may initially lose integration benefits but in the long term it may benefit from 
new capabilities absorbed from external partners by the acquired firm. However, the eventual 
recombination and transfer of these capabilities from the target into the parent innovations will 
in turn reduce their distinctiveness and lead to increased amalgamation.  
 This work contributes primarily to the post-acquisition literature and theorizes some of 
dynamics between integration, trust, and autonomy over the successive phases of an acquisition. 
Moreover, our analysis also contributes to a better understanding of the affective dimensions of 
organizational identity (Graebner, Heimeriks et al. 2017) and their causal interactions with 
resource orchestration, especially by highlighting the link between future desired image (Gioia, 
Schultz et al. 2000) and strategic vision (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2011). Finally, with its focus on 
managerial agency, our process theorizing also contributes to the recent call to capture the 
underlying change mechanisms in action and what focal actors actually do to renew their 
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Figure 1: Sales, employees, R&D employees, patents, and models 1999 – 2017 
 
Figure 2 : Aventador embedded case studies components and companies 
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